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TTC Board Meeting: April 11, 2024 (Part II) 2024 Asset Management Plan

On the TTC Board agenda for April 11, 2024, a long report describes the TTC’s 2024 Asset Management Plan. This document has been in the works for some time. It arises from an Ontario Regulation in 2017 and a City Council Corporate Asset Management Policy adopted in 2019 whose intent is that there is long term sustainability and accountability for City assets. The TTC as a local Board of the City is subject to this policy.

This is a long article reviewing an even longer document. For a general overview, some readers may prefer to stop at the break just before the chart of “condition scores”. The remainder of the article reviews some of the detail in the Plan, its strengths and shortcomings.

General Observations

Although the document gives a unified impression in its design, it was produced with information from many sources in the TTC. Some of these, notably for the streetcar system, betray unfamiliarity with various assets, or a sloppiness in editing. Some information is dated and reflects conditions a year or more ago with little or no mention of works in progress and how they would affect the review. Any future budget planning must be based on current, accurate data.

As with so much information reported by the TTC, far too many data are reported as overall averages without the granularity needed to flag key problems. Some projects risks are described as if no work has been done when in fact they might be well on the way to completion. Was it just too much trouble to accurately portray the state of some assets? That is troubling in the context of other events throwing the TTC’s ongoing maintenance practices into question.

One section of the Plan deals with “systems” which, in many cases, are networks of devices. A failure within a system does not necessarily affect just one part, but can have a farther reach as seen in the recent fire near Islington Station. Moving up a level from that, the Plan is divided into major topic areas, and several of these are related although the plan treats them as separate entities. This subdivision is, in part, dictated by Provincial Regulation.

Trains need cars, but they also need track and power, not to mention stations. It is important to see the transit network both as a complex collection but also at the detailed level. One thing the Plan does is provide a tutorial for those who only know part of the system, notably the politicians responsible for funding transit and choosing its goals.

An important part of any asset plan is the recognition of alternate futures depending on what is done, or more critically not done, in the short-to-medium term. The cumulative effect of deferred work during economic downturns is not immediately apparent, but can create a backlog requiring significant effort and spending just to get back to “normal” conditions. If deferrals last long enough, they affect corporate culture and become the accepted way of doing business. An organization can forget what proper asset management and maintenance look like after years of aiming for a too-low target.

Funding partners grouse about above-inflation cost growth when their own penny-pinching, coupled with management making the best of a bad situation, created the situation in the first place. It is important to recognize the difference between higher costs through factors like materials and labour, and higher spending required to reverse a backlog of overdue work and restore the system to good, steady-state condition.

An issue that appears in several parts of the Plan is the effect of vehicle electrification. This touches the bus fleet and related maintenance and charging facilities, and the non-revenue fleet. The change in propulsion and control technology affects maintenance workers who must adapt and be trained, as well as the equipment needed to support an electric fleet. Electrification is not just a matter of buying a new style of bus, but a pervasive change in a large part of TTC operations that will extend over a decade.

We may reach a point where diesel-hybrids are regarded as a minor “legacy” fleet from days gone by, but that time is a long way off. Co-existence of two modes will continue for many years.

The City has contemplated but not yet adopted a long-range goal not just to fully electrify transit operations, but to very substantially increase service levels. This would have a pervasive effect on the entire asset base, staffing and future budgets. The Plan includes an overview of proposed rapid transit expansion, but there is no discussion of the service increase scheme.

Overview

The 2024 Plan sets out the TTC’s many classes of assets, their condition, ongoing maintenance and replacement cycle and some information on cost. This leans heavily to the Capital side of TTC budgeting and the large known shortfall in committed and likely funding over the next 15 years. Some information is incomplete because the TTC data collection is still underway.

While this Asset Management Plan meets the requirements of the Regulation for 2024, the next phase of compliance, due on July 1, 2025, requires the TTC to have a financial plan that identifies the funding needs to ensure all assets the funding to ensure all assets are maintained in a state of good repair to meet future levels of service. The 2025 Asset Management Plan will also further inform the preparation of the TTC’s Capital Investment Plan (CIP). The TTC’s 2024-2038 CIP has identified a total of $47.855 billion in base capital needs over a 15-year period, of which $12.398 billion is funded, leaving $35.457 billion in unfunded capital needs.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 7

That paragraph does not break out “State of Good Repair” (SOGR) items from the overall budget, and yet that will be essential in deciding where to allocate available money. Moreover, the focus here is on Capital with no mention of day-to-day maintenance funded from the Operating budget.

A sense of the TTC’s scale is given early in the Plan:

The scope of assets that the TTC owns and manages is large and varied, and comprises of the vehicles, infrastructure, facilities and support systems necessary to operate and maintain the TTC’s bus, subway and streetcar services. The asset inventory changes regularly as new assets are commissioned and older assets are decommissioned at the end of life.

The vehicle fleet consists of 2,572 accessible buses (including 250 paratransit Wheel-Trans buses), 204 streetcars and 143 subway trains, with the fleet and other asset classes supported by more than 900 non-revenue vehicles. There are a further 6,400 small and 1,900 large items of industrial equipment, which support the maintenance of TTC assets.

The TTC maintains more than 70 kilometres of mainline subway track across three active lines (following the decommissioning of Line 3 in 2023) and 388 kilometres of Streetcar Way. Streetcars are powered by 454 kilometres of overhead/traction power feeders and 368 kilometres of overhead contact system.

Across the subway and streetcar network, the TTC is responsible for the maintenance of 77 box structures, 43 bored tunnels, 75 bridges, four culverts, 170 retaining walls and 474 miscellaneous structures. In addition there are 38 overhead structures that are maintained by the City. The Prince Edward Viaduct is jointly maintained by the TTC and the City.

The vehicle fleet is stored, maintained and operated from 22 separate facilities located across the TTC network, which include garages, carhouses, yards, and shops. There are also 58 substations to support movement of fleet and provide power to the facilities. Across the subway network (including the now decommissioned Line 3), there are 75 subway stations with 164 elevators and 329 escalators moving both passengers and freight. The TTC also maintains more than 9,500 bus and streetcar stops/shelters, alongside two bus terminals and nine Wheel-Trans hubs.

Corporate and professional services also operate from five administrative buildings across the city, and the TTC maintains 29 other buildings, including emergency service buildings, operator convenience and waiting rooms, as well as a number of parking lots.

Operation of transit services across all three transportation modes is facilitated and supported by communication, signalling, electrical and mechanical systems. These systems are made up of many thousands of individual assets, with further details contained in the relevant sections of this Plan.

TTC Asset Management Plan 2024 at p. 7

Assets are divided into five classes as specified by the Regulation, and their total replacement cost is $25.1 billion. They vary quite substantially in age with some being over a century old (early streetcar facilities) to quite recent. The condition of each class also varies.

Considering the known cost of projects now planned and in progress, to the degree these are revealed, these numbers could well understate the true replacement costs. A related complication is the ownership of some assets by Metrolinx, but their operation as part of the TTC network.

Some assets are consolidated in this table in part because the source data are in insurance reports organized for that purpose. For example, IT Systems are included under the contents of Facilities, not under Systems. However, there is no detailed review in the Plan of IT systems, their age and technology, nor of their need for “state of good repair”.

ClassReplacement Cost ($ billion)Condition
FleetRevenue vehicles (buses, streetcars, subway trains), non-revenue vehicles, and the industrial equipment used to service those vehicles.$7.12.1 (Good) to 3.7 (Adequate)
Linear InfrastructureSubway track, Streetcar track and overhead power.$2.81.0 (Excellent) to 4.0 (Marginal)
FacilitiesStorage and Maintenance facilities, subway stations, administrative buildings; bus and streetcar stops.$5.0Unknown – Not enough data exists to provide a rating.
SystemsCommunications systems, signals, electrical systems, and mechanical systems.$1.11.0 (Excellent) to 5.0 (Critical/Poor)
StructuresBox structures, bored tunnels, stations, bridges, Prince Edward Viaduct (track beams and sidewalks), culverts, retaining walls, and miscellaneous structures.$9.1Very Good to Very Poor
Total$25.1

Of particular interest in this list is the group Structures which holds over one third of the replacement value for the system. This is rarely mentioned in funding and priority debates, in part because much in this category has a very long lifespan. However, as the subway ages, proportionately more structures enter a period where preventative maintenance is essential, and in some cases major reconstruction is needed. (This is a separate systemic issue from basic problems of new subways with water penetration and other faults from the day they open.)

A second group, Facilities, includes the above ground part of the system and, like Structures comprises many assets with long lifespans such as buildings. These too have ongoing preventative maintenance needs but with a lower profile than new trains or signals, let alone new lines, for funding.

Much recent discussion of State of Good Repair focused on the Capital Budget and shortfall, but substantial day-to-day work is required to keep various assets in good shape. A shortfall in the Plan is a sense of the cost, adequacy or funding of this work even though it is integral to preventing a decline in asset quality. This ties into recent discussions about system maintenance.

Life cycle activities and the point at which they occur vary between assets according to their inherent nature, the required level of service, their operating context, use and condition. As assets approach the end of their serviceable life, life extension programs may also be implemented to prolong service life ahead of replacement or renewal. However, it should be noted that as assets near the end of service life, the maintenance cost will increase significantly. Details of the life cycle activities applicable to each asset class and the sub-assets within each class are contained in the relevant sections of the attached plan.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 6

Under each subclass of assets, there is a discussion of related risks. These show how some aspects of any Plan and Budget are related, although generally at a time frame where effects are not immediately obvious. For example, if the average age of a fleet rises, then more running maintenance is needed plus a life extension program. This affects both the Capital and Operating Budgets.

Because subsidy arrangements for these budgets differ, avoidance of Capital spending might trigger a rise in Operating spending at a higher rate for the City (or higher fares) because a lower proportion of the Operating Budget comes from other governments. However, at the local level, the temptation to “make do” can lead to declining maintenance, reliability and service.

The 2024 AMP, prepared in accordance with the requirements of O. Reg. 588/17, affirms that an estimated 50% or $12.6 billion of TTC assets are entering, or in some cases, are well into their twilight years.

If half of the assets are “well into their twilight years”, this is not an overnight change, but rather the effect of many years of deferred maintenance and replacement. This is particularly true of the subway network which was once brand new and required less maintenance, let alone replacement of major components. However, as infrastructure ages, it can move “into the twilight” with ongoing plans and budgets based on earlier years.

Proper funding should not just maintain the existing rate but grow to reduce and keep overall asset ages within a range of reliable service.

Particular concern over the lack of funding for state of good repair applies currently to:

  1. Line 2 Bloor-Danforth subway elements (power, signals, communications systems, and vehicles) that are at/or approaching end of life.
  2. Facilities maintenance of garages, yards, carhouses and various other buildings (HVAC, roofs, structures, elevators, escalators, and plumbing).
  3. Bus fleet with the majority now over halfway through its lifecycle.

The streetcar network will predictably be at risk within five to 10 years without capital funding commitments for rehabilitation.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 7

Overall funding, of course, must respond to both the existing system and service as well as growth. Discussions of “growth” focus politically on major new rapid transit lines, but this can sideline plans and funding for general increase in service quantity and quality across the network.

An important part of any Asset Management Plan will be recognition of future costs that will be triggered by system expansion of both rapid transit and surface networks. Only two years ago, Toronto agreed to take on the operating and non-lifecycle costs of the Eglinton line, but that did not last. In the short term, the Toronto-Ontario “new deal” includes funding for operation and maintenance of Lines 5 and 6, but not for expansion of the existing service.

The TTC has many plans, but several of these tie back to the Annual and 5-Year Service Plans. After all, it is mobility and hence service that the TTC provides, and medium to long range aspirations for service affect the entire organization. Service might sit an the heart of the chart below, but one would be hard-pressed to see this in a typical debate at the TTC Board or Council.

Over the years, a troubling aspect of TTC debates is that “service” comes last in the discussions and is always “subject to budget availability”. Rarely is there an aspirational view of the transit network and its future. A desire for more service can run headlong into the currently planned level of fleet and facilities growth.

Attempts to engage in such discussions trigger rounds of “we can’t afford it” or “not now, maybe later” that hamper a strategic approach to all TTC planning. The lead times to scale up parts of the system require sustained commitment. It is ironic that we are willing to wait a decade and more to get a new rapid transit line, but will not invest in the short term to enhance and expand the existing system.

The Plan’s primary function is asset management. It is not a forward planning document to pursue “what if” questions about possible transit futures, although it does acknowledge that current plans have implications. Only recently did Council grasp the effect of getting many new rapid transit lines built by Ontario, but with the expectation of local funding for operations. The Ontario-Toronto “new deal” delayed, but did not eliminate this problem. Running more service and maintaining more infrastructure costs money that fares will not cover.

Level of Service

In 2013, the TTC introduced its first 5-Year Corporate Plan with the vision: To be a transit system that makes Toronto proud. The next 5-Year Corporate Plan is due to be published in 2024 and forms part of an integrated planning and performance framework the TTC utilizes. This framework demonstrates how the goals, objectives and intended outcomes of the TTC can be achieved through the alignment of key business planning activities. In addition, the 5-Year Service Plan & 10-Year Outlook (2020-2024) identifies service-related improvements to public transit service in the city of Toronto. An updated version (2024-2028) is expected to be published in 2024.

The Service Plan also identify [sic] how the TTC is responding to growth requirements, meeting the challenges of changing ridership demands and meeting the financial challenges of maintaining existing service levels and upholding the state of good repair. Given the significant pending growth in the size of the transit portfolio, it should be noted that there will be an increase in funding pressure to sustain the existing level of service for the asset portfolio.

2024 Asset Management Plan, Covering Report at p. 5
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King Street Transit Priority Corridor Update: May 2024

Toronto’s Infrastructure and Environment Committee will consider a report at its May 2, 2024 meeting which updates Council on the status of the King Street corridor.

A notable shortcoming in the report is the absence of a map showing locations of proposed or completed works, and how King Street relates to other nearby sites where roads have limited capacity or are completely blocked.

As previously reported, the City implemented new measures late in 2023 to resolve traffic gridlock at several intersections along the corridor between Bathurst and Jarvis streets. Many overlapping construction projects reduced road capacity and caused severe backlogs on King Street rendering transit service, especially eastbound, almost worthless. Charts later in this article update my previous reports on the situation and how travel times on King have returned to preconstruction levels.

Recently, new traffic signals have been installed at the King/Yonge and King/Church intersections where through movements by most traffic is prohibited. A constant red signal with green arrows for permitted turns is intended to make through movements a “red light running” offense, although the arrangement and signage confuse motorists. The intent is that the arrangement, together with red light traffic cameras, will deter motorists from driving straight through, although it remains to be seen how well this will work.

A complication is that “authorized vehicles” (i.e. licensed taxis) are allowed through between 10pm and 5am, but to the casual observer a car is a car is a car, especially when it is operating for a service like Uber as opposed to a branded taxi with company colours. When traffic agents are present to manage the intersections, motorists go where they are told, but at other times the signals are often ignored. Driving through a full red signal is not a behaviour that should be encouraged, especially out of frustration.

Facing west at King and Church, northwest corner

Travel times across the priority corridor dropped substantially after traffic agents prevented motorists from blocking intersections, and a further improvement is expected when work is complete on parallel streets related mainly to the 501 Queen diversion tracks for Ontario Line construction. Some eastbound traffic now attempting to use King will shift north to Adelaide.

The date for the 501 Queen shift to Richmond/Adelaide is not yet certain. However, track repairs are planned at King & Church in August, and it would make sense to have an alternate streetcar route across the core available by then. Whether it will be is quite another matter.

The effectiveness of these improvements is being monitored and, if successful, Transportation Services is proposing to implement similar changes at other locations along the King Street corridor. It is anticipated that these measures, if successful, may also mitigate the need for Traffic Agents at two or more locations.

Update Report at p. 4

In the short term, there is a budgetary issue because Toronto Police are providing direction and enforcement at some locations. This provides an incentive for technological solutions.

The City intends to purse automated enforcement, but current legislation only allows this for red light running, but not for entering and blocking an intersection because there is no space clear on the far side. “Blocking the box” cannot currently be charged against a vehicle owner, only against a driver. This must change to match red light enforcement where the owner is charged regardless of who is actually driving.

Also under consideration (and subject to the same legislative requirements) are offenses such as blocking bicycle and reserved transit lanes. (Note that there are no reserved transit lanes on King.)

What is painfully clear since the priority corridor was installed is that motorists will do whatever they damn well like unless there is enforcement. Toronto’s laissez-faire attitude undermines whatever bylaws Council might enact.

Since their installation, the curb lane pedestrian areas at stops have deteriorated. After a mid-2023 inspection, 180 missing or badly damaged yellow tactile mats and five bollards were replaced. Other needed work includes basic street cleaning, graffiti removal on barriers, pothole repair and repainting of pavement markings. These are to be addressed in 2024. Another annoyance not mentioned in the report is the relocation of stops without concurrent shifts in transit shelters and benches. The gradual decline of the pedestrian facilities on King tells its own story about the City’s real priorities.

A trial raised platform for passengers was installed at Peter Street and at Portland Street in 2019, although the latter was removed for adjacent construction activity. That platform will be “redeployed” elsewhere. Of the 20 stops along the corridor, some can accommodate platforms without any utility conflicts. Five-to-seven will be installed in fall 2024 (locations not yet named). The remaining stops require co-ordination with utilities for the effect of a platform on their access with the intent of installing these in 2025.

Some mid-block curb extensions for public realm improvements will be designed in 2024 and built in 2025. However, major work to reconfigure King Street is not planned until after 2030, presumably when the Ontario Line is open (or at least substantially complete) and its construction disruptions end. In the meantime, improvements will be made where possible in co-ordination with other construction in the area.

The bylaw governing the corridor will be amended to include the Billy Bishop Airport Shuttle as a service that is permitted to use King Street as a transit vehicle.

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TTC Surface Route Stats: 2019 to 2023

The TTC’s Planning Page includes reports with statistics for each of the years 2019 through 2023 giving weekday passenger counts, vehicle hours, vehicle mileage and peak vehicles for the fall in each year. Collectively, this information shows the status of ridership and service on the surface network just before the pandemic and through the years following.

Updated April 25, 2024 at 4:10pm: 505 Dundas operated with buses in 2019, and so comparisons to later years’ stats when it was a streetcar show a “recovery” that has more to do with vehicle size and service quality than with an apples-to-apples comparison. This article has been updated in a few places to reflect this. Thanks to a reader for spotting this.

Several points emerge when these data are collected together and compared year-over-year at a route level and for the bus and streetcar networks as a whole.

  • The TTC talks of service recovery to 95% of prepandemic levels. This is based on the number of vehicle hours operated. This can be misleading for various reasons, notably:
    • The scheduled speed of many routes is now slower than it was in 2019 due to adjustments both to deal with traffic conditions and to provide more recovery time for operators. Reducing the speed lowers the amount of service provided and so even if vehicle hours are unchanged, there is less service.
  • Streetcar vehicle hours are higher in 2023 than 2019, but this is due to bus substitution on various routes or route segments. The use of smaller buses pushes up the vehicle hours required to serve the streetcar network.
  • There has been an ongoing drop in the speed of streetcar routes from 2019 to 2023. This is in part due to replacement of the older CLRVs with the new Flexitys, in part due to schedule changes for congestion and various construction projects, and in part due to more restrictive operating practices that slow streetcar movements at junctions.
  • Speed of local and express bus operations also fell from 2019 to 2023, although not as much as for streetcars.
  • The replacement of the SRT by bus routes has added to bus hours and mileage, but to a lesser extent to bus ridership because continuous trips through STC to Kennedy Station count as only one boarding.

The recovery rates for subsets of the network vary, as they do for different metrics.

MetricLocal BusExpress BusStreetcar (*)Total
Boardings
20191,176,496215,163318,4531,710,022
20231,016,106208,537259,7341,484,377
% Recovery86%97%82%87%
Vehicle Hours
201919,7553,3103,05026,135
202318,7173,7523,68826,157
% Recovery95%113%121%100%
Vehicle Kilometres
2019344,83271,62841,854458,314
2023304,48074,84537,211416,536
% Recovery88%104%89%91%
Passengers/Hour
201959.565.0104.465.4
202354.355.670.456.7
% Recovery91%86%67%87%
Kilometres/Hour
201917.421.613.717.5
202316.319.910.115.9
% Recovery93%92%74%91%
AM Peak Vehicles
20191,2642952191,778
20231,0982941971,589
% Recovery87%100%90%89%
PM Peak Vehicles
20191,2402832141,737
20231,1713012061,678
% Recovery94%106%96%97%
(*) The high vehicle hours recovery for streetcars in 2023 is caused by bus substitutions on part or all of 501 Queen, 504 King and 512 St. Clair in fall 2023. More buses are required to provide replacement service, hence more vehicle hours an kilometres. Other “streetcar” values for 2023 are distorted for the same reason. See the sections on specific metrics and route-by-route data for details.

A further complication is that with ridership shifts, total riding on a route might go up, but the distribution of riding through the day and week may have changed. This is not reflected in TTC data which simply gives a daily total figure for each route.

This article consolidates five years’ worth of data for all surface routes in one place for easy reference, and shows that “recovery” is a complex subject where details are hidden by looking at only one metric and at overall averages.

At the end of the article there are linked PDFs containing all of the tables.

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East End Streetcar Diversions April 19-29, 2024

Once again, streetcar service in the east end will be disrupted for construction diversions, although this will not be as long lasting as projects in recent years.

Updated April 27, 2024: The diversion for work at the Don Bridge on Queen Street finished early and all streetcar routes returned to their normal routes today.

505 Dundas Late Night Diversion

On Friday, April 19 and Saturday, April 21, service after 11pm on 505 Dundas cars will divert both ways via the Carlton route (College, Carlton, Parliament, Gerrard) between Bay and Broadview. Replacement bus service will cover the missed portion of the streetcar route. This work is for track drain repairs at Mutual Street.

501/503/504/508/301/304 Don Bridge Diversion

From Monday, April 22 at 4am to Monday, April 29 at 4am, all streetcar service will divert via Dundas between Broadview and Parliament to bypass expansion joint replacement on the Queen Street bridge at the Don River. The work finished early and normal routings across the bridge were restored on April 27.

Shuttle bus service will operate on Queen between Carlaw and Sherbourne, and on the King route between Broadview Station and Sherbourne.

As of 7am on April 20, the TTC has posted a Service Change notice for King Street services (503, 504 and 304), but has not yet posted one for 501/301 Queen or 508 Lake Shore although these are also affected. The 501B bus service between Broadview and Bathurst should continue on its normal route. There is also an item on their News page describing this change.

Although not shown on this map, the diversion should not affect the 504A Distillery service.

Expansion joint replacement on this bridge occurs from time to time as this is a high traffic area, and the bridge can be damaged if the joint is in poor condition from vibration of passing streetcars.

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King West Construction Update

The City of Toronto has announced that the planned replacement of track at the intersection of King & Dufferin Streets will not occur in 2024 due to “supply chain issues”. Instead this work will be included in the 2025 construction schedule which already included reconstruction of King from Dufferin to Close.

The intersection replacement was originally planned for June-July with full closure of both streets. That will not happen and routes will stay on their current diversions pending reopening of King Street east of Dufferin. That was planned for year-end, but has now been moved forward to November 2024.

The project website contains current details of plans.

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King, Adelaide & York Update: April 2024

Adelaide Street track almost finished! New traffic signals on King! Almost no work on York Street. And some really appalling track.

All photos in this article were taken by me on April 10 and 14, 2024.

Updated April 17, 2024: Photos showing pavement patching at King & Church added.

Updated April 21, 2024: Photo showing rail gap and pavement patch on westbound rail, west side of the intersection added.

The basic problem with some of the repairs is that they do not necessarily provide a continuous surface for streetcars. The reason for this is that the diamonds are designed to carry cars on their flanges so that the main part of the wheel does not produce the familiar “thunk” where at the crossing of two tracks. Some of the breaks shown here are within the diamond, and the flange way has completely broken off. As streetcars pass, their wheels fall off of the adjacent intact flange way into the gap even though the main rail head is continuous. This is particularly evident on the northerly westbound rail (see photos at the end of the article).

Updated April 26, 2024: Photo of work in progress on York Street south of Richmond added.

Adelaide Street

The two remaining chunks of new/replacement track are finally being installed on Adelaide Street, and some work is underway for new overhead. This will be the eastbound 501 Queen diversion for the Ontario Line construction.

Adelaide W from Bay 2024.04.10
Adelaide W. to York 2024.04.10
Adelaide E. to Victoria 2024.04.10
Adelaide E. from Sheppard to Bay 2024.04.14

York Street

Almost nothing has happened with the new track to be installed on York south from Queen. There is a pile of rail on Queen west of York, and some pavement cuts prior to excavation, but that’s all. Metrolinx is not exactly rushing with their part of the project.

Updated April 26, 2024

Excavation for a new trackbed appears to be complete between Richmond and Adelaide Streets.

Looking north from Adelaide toward Richmond on York. Apr. 26/24

King Street Signals

New signals intended to deter straight through auto movements have been activated on King at Church and at Yonge. The intent is to make a straight through movement one that must drive against a solid red signal. If the City ever installs red light cameras, there will be a bonanza in tickets.

The design provides separate signals for pedestrians, cyclists and authorized vehicles (mostly transit, but also taxis from 10pm to 5am). The signage, already complicated, is now more extensive and guaranteed to confuse any motorist. Indeed, during my visit, a 501 Queen bus created a traffic jam waiting for a conventional green signal while ignoring the transit signal.

Here is the collection of signs westbound at King and Church Streets. The signals are in the process of turning red for King, and they show an amber aspect for transit and cyclists.

An important point about signals is that they do not only tell people what they can do (for example, the red hand tells pedestrians not to walk, a green bicycle tells cyclists they can proceed). This gives some hint to everyone of how all traffic is expected to behave.

Nobody knows what an “authorized vehicle” is, and this is especially tricky for unmarked “cabs” like Ubers. If a car drives through a full red signal, is it allowed or not?

The large red aspect on the main signal (with the yellow backboard) never changes, but it will on occasion be joined by a green arrow in the bottom aspect.

Here is the cycle of displays eastbound at King and Yonge as east-west travel gradually opens up.

1. Transit and right turns allowed
2. Transit allowed, right turns ending
3. Transit allowed
4. Transit, cyclists and pedestrians allowed
5. Pedestrian cycle counting down. Next comes the amber phase for others.

This confusion shows how important the establishment of simple, clear barriers like a few short transit malls with planters and other physical limitations. Send motorists a clear message: “Don’t even think about driving here.”

All photos taken on April 14, 2024.

King & Church Track

Although the TTC told a good story recently on their subway track maintenance, the situation on the streetcar network is not quiet so rosy. A low point is at the intersection of Church & King, long overdue for complete reconstruction, where there are three separate pavement gaps and ad hoc rail repairs.

Westbound north rail 2024.04.14
Eastbound south rail 2024.04.14
Westbound south rail 2024.04.14

It is hard to take TTC claims that they value safety highly and repair faults promptly with conditions like this.

Updated April 17 & 21, 2024: The photos below show recently applied pavement patching.

Westbound north rail 2024.04.21
Eastbound south rail looking west 2024.04.17
Westbound south rail looking west 2024.04.17
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TTC Board Meeting: April 11, 2024 (Part I)

The TTC Board met on April 11 with a long agenda. Among items of interest are:

  • CEO’s Report
  • * 2024 Asset Management Plan
  • Line 3 SRT Incident Investigation and Subway Track Continuous Improvement Initiatives
  • Procurement Authorization – Subway Track Rail Milling Services
  • * City Council Transmittal – CC15.1 Budget Implementation Including Property Tax Rates, User Fees and Related Matters
  • * Financial and Major Projects Update for the Year Ended December 31, 2023
  • * Easier Access Phase III – Project Status Update April 2024
  • Approval of Public Art Concepts for the Bay, Castle Frank, Christie, Donlands and Lansdowne Stations

I have already written about the SRT report, and here will discuss only the deputations and discussion at the Board meeting.

(*) Part II will review the Asset Management Plan, and Part III will cover updates on TTC finances, Major Projects and Easier Access.

A Draft Report on the TTC’s “Innovation and Sustainability Framework” was deferred to the May Board meeting, and I will comment on that when it reappears.

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TTC Plans Buses on 510 Spadina June-October 2024

The TTC has announced plans for construction projects that will require replacement of streetcars by buses on 510 Spadina starting June 23 until October 2024.

In June and July, overhead will be rebuilt between King and Queens Quay. This will not affect route 509 Harbourfront, and service on that route will be increased to offset the missing 510 Spadina cars on Queens Quay.

In August through October, overhead work will shift to the section from College to Spadina Station.

At Spadina Station, track will be replaced and other work will be done in preparation for a platform extension that will be enabled by excavation for a nearby condo.

There is no word on plans for the overhead between College and King, or whether another shutdown will be required for that segment.

Both the 510 daytime and 310 night buses will operate in mixed traffic stopping curbside along their route. Buses will use the surface loop at Spadina Station.

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Ten Questions About the SRT Derailment

Among the reports on the TTC Board agenda for April 11 is a recap of the SRT investigation. I have already written about shortcomings and contradictions in this report and will not belabour that here.

The fundamental question is whether management are being entirely transparent in their presentation. If there is someone on the Board bold enough to challenge them, here are a few key questions:

  1. Ten days before the derailment, a high reaction rail was reported at the site, but this was logged as a low priority problem. The misalignment, reported as 1/2 inch, is on a par with the normal clearance between the LIM motor under SRT cars and the reaction rail. What repairs, if any, were made to correct this problem, and were the bolts holding the reaction rail checked for their integrity?
  2. At the site, joins in both the reaction rail cap and the main reaction rail were at the same position. This weakens the structure because the two sections cannot reinforce each other against deflection by magnetic forces as trains pass. The sections are supposed to be staggered to prevent this type of failure. Why weren’t they, and how many other locations on the SRT shared the same problem?
  3. How recently installed were the bolts that failed at the derailment site?
  4. Consultant reports state that the manufacturer, Hilti, did not intend its anchors to be used in a situation where the bolts would flex under load as on the SRT. Why was this not reported to the Board in the September 2023 briefing?
  5. New bolts on the SRT were not those supplied by Hilti, but were substituted by the TTC. The replacement bolts were longer and they used a different thread profile than the originals. Were these approved by Hilti?
  6. What portions of the SRT were reviewed by the consultants, and did they find other defects similar to those at the derailment site?
  7. Have all the reports, either internal or produced by consultants, about the derailment been made public? If not, why not, and when will they be made available?
  8. TTC management claims that they did not reduce the level of maintenance on the SRT even though it was to close in fall 2023. However, the consultants point out that capital repairs (as opposed to routine inspections) were discontinued, and that only that type of work would have detected loose reaction rail bolts. How does TTC management reconcile these claims?
  9. At the September 2023 Board meeting, TTC staff stated that the consultant’s recommendations for work to inspect and restore the SRT to safe operation would take longer then the planned remaining life of the line. How can the need to do so much work be reconciled with claims of regular inspection and repair?
  10. Why were the consultant reports posted to the TTC’s website in November and December 2023 with no notice to the public nor to the Board?

The TTC would like to put the derailment behind them and focus on improvements going forward. However, one must ask how long the practices leading to the SRT crash were used, and whether shortfalls were the result of budgetary “efficiencies” rather than good engineering. By extension, what other parts of the TTC might be compromised, and what is needed to correct this situation.

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Revisionist SRT History at the TTC

On April 3, 2024, the advocacy group TTCriders submitted a request to the City of Toronto Auditor General for a review of TTC maintenance practices. This arose both from the July 2023 SRT derailment and other recent events on the subway including a broken switch and a flurry of slow orders.

Full disclosure: I was asked to review a draft of the TTCriders letter and suggested minor edits, but am not a party to their request.

Both in the staff presentation at the TTC’s September 26, 2023 Board Meeting and in comments responding to TTCriders, the TTC has been quite clear that it regards the root cause of the SRT derailment to be loose mounting bolts for the reaction rail. This does not tell the full story, especially in light of consultant reports that were published well after the September 26 meeting.

The published version of the Network Rail report is dated August 23. The Hatch report is Sept 28. Gannett-Fleming’s is Oct 12. Systra’s is Nov 30. For an extensive review of these, see my previous article:

A common thread in the consultant reports was that inspection and maintenance practices were inadequate, staff were not trained in the potential danger of defects that they discovered, and many staff were juniors who had not fully qualified as track inspectors. At the time, this was treated as a problem limited to the SRT. Recent events suggest that poor practices extend beyond to the rail network generally, and this is a more pervasive problem than originally reported.

The staff presentation in September was part of a larger review of the SRT replacement service, and the report title gives no hint that the derailment is part of this. Elsewhere in the same agenda, the CEO’s report celebrates the “Farewell to the SRT” event but makes no mention of the derailment reviews.

In the TTC’s review of these reports, presented in the April 11 Board meeting agenda, these suppositions are countered, although not entirely convincingly. It is fair to assume that most people will not be familiar with the detailed reports and will take the TTC’s rebuttal at face value. [The April 11 report is discussed later in this article.]

TTC spokesperson Stuart Green said CEO Rick Leary ordered the external reports the night of the derailment to get answers on what happened while including links to the reports posted on the TTC website. He also said the matter was discussed at the Sept. 26 TTC board meeting.

“TTCriders was represented at this same meeting so presumably they heard the same information and are fully aware what the root cause was,” he wrote.

CityNews April 3, 2024

Certainly TTCriders and anyone else attending the September 26 meeting or playing the video later “heard the same information”. The problem lies in being “fully aware” of the root cause which was not the loose bolts, but the failure to detect and correct the problem, and more generally the state of inspection work and staff training. A related problem identified by the consultants was that previous repairs at the derailment site had created a weakness in the reaction rail which, combined with loose bolts, made the failure causing the derailment more likely.

The September presentation noted the difficulty of inspecting the reaction rail supports which required hands-and-knees posture to peer under the track in all manner of weather and lighting conditions. In practice, this level of inspection was rare because it was so difficult. Oddly enough, the Vancouver SkyTrain system uses a separate test, striking the support bolts with a tool, and listening for a dull “thud” instead of a clear “ping”. The “thud” indicates a loose bolt requiring closer inspection.

A common indication that there were problems is scuffing of the reaction rail. This was noted at several locations on the line. One does not have to peer under the track to see this early indicator of a developing problem. However, scuffing could also result from minor clearance problems with specific cars and this would not necessarily be interpreted as a location warranting detailed reaction rail review, especially if the marks had been seen repeatedly.

The most damning item is in the TTC’s own Maximo defect tracking system as reported by an inspection team two weeks before the derailment (July 9, 2023). The item highlighted below shows the reaction rail was “raised 1/2 inch on the approach end”. This was a defect serious enough to be visible without the usual difficulty of inspecting under the reaction rail. A related oddity is a two-week gap in reporting of any further problems leading up to the derailment.

In summarizing the investigation at the September meeting, TTC staff stated that the “immediate cause” of the derailment was the failed anchor bolts. Further, the consultants had recommended that if the SRT were to resume operation through November, then all of the newer bolts installed from 2016 onward should be tested and retrofitted as necessary. This work would have required “time well beyond the planned closure date”, and so the line remained closed. (See meeting recording.)

The estimated scope of this work implies a pervasive problem that was either undetected or whose potential severity was not understood, or worse ignored.

An important distinction here is that the term “immediate cause” has morphed into “root cause”. No matter the frequency of track inspections, the loose bolt problems would not be detected because they were not visible.

A further concern is the manner in which consultant reports were quietly posted on the TTC’s website with no announcement in November and December 2023. My coverage of them was the first that some TTC Board members I have spoken with knew about them.

The documents are posted under the Projects page for the future of Line 3 SRT replacement service, hardly a location one would look for technical info on the derailment. Three of the reports were posted in mid November and one in December. It is easy to verify that they were not there earlier by looking at Internet archives for the page on October 2 and December 7, 2023. The first three reports went up almost two months after the Board meeting, not “a few weeks” as expected. However, there was no media release about them nor were they brought to the Board’s attention.

At the September meeting, Councillor Matlow asked whether there could have been a reduction in maintenance or negligence due to the anticipated shutdown of the line. The Gannett-Fleming consultant replied that there were multiple possible causes for the bolts coming loose, but did not address the frequency of inspections.

Staff and consultants reiterated that inspections for problems of loose bolts were very difficult and they would generally not be spotted. It would not matter how often a walking inspection passed potentially defective reaction rail mounts because these were not visible. Indeed, there was an inspection on the morning of the derailment that found no issues.

The Network Rail consultant mentioned marks on the reaction rail surface in passing, but then talked about the impossibility of seeing bolt problems because they are under the reaction rail, and movement was seen only with a train passing. He also said that issues were being reported and fixed, but this is contradicted by the Maximo logs which show a reaction rail lifted 1/2 inch at the site two weeks before the derailment (see above).

One major problem with the Maximo records is that there is no explicit log of repairs made in response to problem reports. Moreover, the consultants noted that almost all issues were logged with a relatively low priority for repairs. I attempted to FOI the repair work orders. However, the TTC advised that the only record was that a defect report was closed, and that there was no information on the actual repair work. If true, this makes post-incident review of the nature of repairs, if any, impossible.

In September, Matlow asks whether there was an increase in maintenance on the aging system. Staff replied about the 2016 plan to replace the anchors which was well-intentioned, but as we know from the reports there were design and installation issues that eventually caused the failure.

Councillor Holyday pursued the anchor design issue. The replies mentioned that there were other locations with scuff marks but mostly from different causes. There was no mention of a problem, flagged by consultants, of repairs that created a weak spot due to cuts in both layers of the reaction rail at various points including the derailment site.

Matlow asked CEO Leary about how the TTC will prevent another accident, and Leary talked briefly about changes already underway and lessons learned. He then mentioned a planned November report, but this was the unfunded capital projects report, not a more detailed SRT report.

Leary pivoted to the Line 2 trains and signal system, and funding problems that could lead to shutdowns. He explicitly mentioned avoiding having old vehicles in service in the future. This ignored his original support for rebuilding Line 2 trains for a 40-year lifespan, and of keeping conventional signals because ATC would have been incompatible with these trains. Now he has changed his position.

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